道德理由的客观性与确定性——非自利契约论的认识论和本体论基础-《南京师大学报》（社会科学版）

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Title:: The Objectivity and Determinateness of Moral Reasons: The Epistemological and Ontological Basis of Contractualism

摘要:: “理由”作为“赞同某事的考量”,在非自利契约论那里是无法还原为任何自然属性的基本的规范性概念。理由是具有客观性的基本事实,可以定义其他伦理学的规范性概念,而无法为其他概念所定义。斯坎伦通过批判欲望理论,来证明理由无需额外的欲望,自身就足以使理性行为者产生相应的行为动机; 通过阐述理由的可选性、力度、普遍性和稳定性,来说明理由的客观性。由于对一个理由的认识是可误的,斯坎伦提出了如何发现正确理由的四阶段的程序,为非自利契约论奠定了认识论的基础。理由本质上作为一种事实与行动之间的规范关系具有真值性,而确定这种真值的途径则是反思平衡方法的应用。

Abstract:: As “agreement of a sort of consideration”, “reason” is a basic normative concept that cannot be reduced to natural facts or properties in contractualism. “Reason” is the basic fact with objectivity and can be used to define other normative concepts which cannot be defined by other concepts. By critiquing the perspective that regards desire as the ultimate basis for reasons, Scanlon argues that reasons by themselves are sufficient to generate corresponding motives for rational agents, without the need for additional desires. He explains the objectivity of reasons by illustrating their optionality, strength, universality, and stability. Because the cognition towards certain reason can be mistaken, Scanlon proposes four stages to find the true reason which lays the foundation for his contractualism. Essentially, as a normative relationship between fact and action, the truth value of reason is determined, and the only method to confirm it is the direct, piecemeal application of the method of reflective equilibrium.