[1]程惠霞*.巡视组反腐败动力机制及其增强路径[J].南京师大学报(社会科学版),2017,(04):044.
 CHENG Hui-xia.Anti-Corruption Inspection Teams:Mechanisms for TheirEmpowerment and Approaches to Their Function Improvement[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University (Social Science Edition),2017,(04):044.
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巡视组反腐败动力机制及其增强路径
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《南京师大学报》(社会科学版)[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2017年04期
页码:
044
栏目:
政治理论与实践
出版日期:
2017-08-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Anti-Corruption Inspection Teams:Mechanisms for TheirEmpowerment and Approaches to Their Function Improvement
作者:
程惠霞*
北京师范大学政府管理学院、美国丹佛大学 Josef Korbel 国际关系学院,100875
Author(s):
CHENG Hui-xia
关键词:
巡视组反腐败动力机制生存战略中国共产党
Keywords:
inspection teamanti-corruption empowerment mechanismsurvival strategythe CPC
摘要:
党内巡视制度本质上是中国共产党在不同时期追求自身可持续性发展的生存战略之一,巡视组及其前身是实现该战略的重要组织依托和运行机制,确保党组织和组织成员之间的目标函数一致。其组长规格配置与年龄分布、灵活多样的履职手段、权限范围与责任机制、“常规巡视”和“专项巡视”相结合聚焦于“一把手”等四个要素构成了超强的巡视组反腐败动力机制,使之具有发现高级官员违纪违法线索的卓越能力。然而,要想持续发挥其事后纠错与惩罚手段的动力,巡视组反腐败机制还需要在四个方面加强建设。
Abstract:
The inner party inspection system is in essence one of the key strategies for the CPC to pursue asustainable development. The current inspection teams and their predecessors are the organ and mechanismfor the implementation of such a strategy,which ensures the agreement in targets between the party membersand their organizations. The mechanism for the empowerment of the inspection teams involves the followingfour factors:the head of the team is well qualified and the ages of the team members show a reasonabledistribution;there are flexible methods for the team members to perform their duties;their power is withinsome sound limits and they are held accountable for their performance;and the regular inspection is combinedwith special inspection,both of which focus on the head of the organization under inspection. All this enablesthe inspection teams to hunt for the clue to the corruption committed by the high rank leaders. However,as ameans of aftermath correction of and punishment for corruption,the inspection system should be improved infour aspects so as to play a sustainable function.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
? 北京师范大学政府管理学院副教授、美国丹佛大学 Josef Korbel 国际关系学院访问学者,100875。本文是国家社科基金重点项目“合作行为的博弈论与计算模拟研究”(13AZD093)、国家留学基金委(CSC)支持项目(201506045082)阶段性成果。
更新日期/Last Update: 2017-08-30