控制股东义务的法构造-《南京师大学报》（社会科学版）

文章信息/Info

Keywords:: controlling shareholders; fiduciary duty; shadow director; shareholder oppression; affiliated transactions

摘要:: 厘清控制股东所负有的义务，应当区分作为所有者的控制股东以及作为管理者的控制股东两个层次。控制股东作为所有者的义务在相当程度上归入侵权法范畴，这一层次的公司法规制集中于控制股东的利益冲突交易。控制地位本身并不产生信义义务，控制股东向管理者的身份切换被严格限定，影子董事有着严格的规范构成。公司法上的控制股东规制一方面应承接董事会中心，由董事的义务与责任衍生控制股东在公司经营决策中的义务与责任。另一方面应确立控制股东规制的规范体系，形成影子董事、关联交易、股东压迫等制度的协同与合力。《中华人民共和国公司法（修订草案）》第191条实际上沿用了共同侵权的民法逻辑，并未将控制股东对公司权力的行使纳入组织法的权责逻辑之中。

Abstract:: A clear definition of the controlling shareholder's duty lies in the distinction between controlling shareholders as the owner and controlling shareholders as the manager. The duties born with controlling shareholders as the owner is substantially regulated by torts, and the corporate law at this level focuses on the affiliated transactions of controlling shareholders. The controlling status itself does not generate fiduciary duty, and the identity switch to manager as well as the definition of shadow director should be strictly formulated. On the one hand, the regulation of controlling shareholders in corporate law shall follow the board-centric principle, and the duties as well as liability of controlling shareholders in corporate business decision-making are derived from those of directors. On the other hand, this regulation is a system in which the shadow director, affiliated transactions and shareholder oppression are combined. Article 191 of the Bill to Revise the Company Law of the People's Republic of China essentially follows the logic of joint torts in civil law, and fails to incorporate the exercise of corporate power by controlling shareholders into the power and accountability of organization law.