[1]江海全.“非意向性”现象学中存在“意向性”吗——米歇尔·亨利情感性伦理学中的意向性问题探析[J].南京师大学报(社会科学版),2024,(02):157-168.
　JIANG Haiquan.Is There“ Intentionality” in the Phenomenology of “Nonintentionality”? The Question of Intentionality in Michel Henry's Affectivity Ethics[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University (Social Science Edition),2024,(02):157-168.
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“非意向性”现象学中存在“意向性”吗——米歇尔·亨利情感性伦理学中的意向性问题探析
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《南京师大学报》（社会科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2024年02期
页码:
157-168
栏目:
哲学研究
出版日期:
2024-04-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Is There“ Intentionality” in the Phenomenology of “Nonintentionality”? The Question of Intentionality in Michel Henry's Affectivity Ethics
作者:
江海全
Author(s):
JIANG Haiquan
关键词:
情感性; 意向性; 非意向性; 生命现象学; 伦理学
Keywords:
affectivity;  intentionality;  non-intentionality;  phenomenology of life;  ethics
摘要:
亨利生命现象学是一种内在的情感性伦理学，并且他的生命现象学通常被冠以“非意向性现象学”的称号。本文要回答的一个关键问题是，意向性在亨利的情感性伦理学中是否缺席或者是否有其应有的位置？在情感性和意向性两个相互关联项中，亨利本人及其后世的解释者普遍强调情感性在其生命现象学中的核心地位，而意向性一般不被重视甚至被忽略了，这造成理解的困难甚至误解亨利的现象学。有必要在亨利激进现象学的框架内分析情感性和意向性之间的关系，从而充分挖掘这种现象学的资源，以进一步扩展其意向性的含义。尤其在伦理学的背景下，当我们问我们应该过什么样的生活时，将情感性的生命转化或表达为意向性的生存的问题似乎是一个核心问题。意向性在亨利伦理学中的重要性并不仅仅限于它是绝对生命的转化或表达——尽管聆听生命之言，或“第二次出生”仍然需要承认绝对生命，然而仅凭这一认识本身并不足以立即回答“我应该做些什么？”也就是说，在实践哲学领域或者伦理学领域，意向性所起的重要作用是第一性的。
Abstract:
Michel Henry's phenomenology of life constitutes an immanent affectivity ethics, often categorized as a “non-intentional phenomenology”. A pivotal inquiry addressed in this paper revolves around whether intentionality is absent or holds a rightful place within Henry's affectivity ethics. Among the intertwined concepts of affectivity and intentionality, Henry himself and the subsequent interpreters have predominantly underscored the significance of affectivity in his phenomenology of life, while intentionality has frequently been overlooked. This oversight renders comprehension, and at times, misinterpretation of Henry's phenomenology challenging. Therefore, it becomes imperative to scrutinize the relationship between affectivity and intentionality within the contours of Henry's radical phenomenology, thereby thoroughly excavating the resources of this phenomenology and expanding its conception of intentionality. Especially from the perspective of ethics, when we ask what kind of life we should live, the question of transforming or expressing an affective life into an intentional existence seems to be a central one. The importance of intentionality in Henry's ethics is not limited to the transformation or expression of absolute life-although listening to the Word of Life, or “second birth” still requires the recognition of absolute life, yet this recognition alone is not sufficient in itself to immediately answer the question: “What should I do?” In other words, in the field of practical philosophy or ethics, intentionality plays a primary role.

相似文献/References:

[1]刘 伟*.身体、意向性与“情感先验”——杜夫海纳对康德美学的梅洛-庞蒂化重构[J].南京师大学报(社会科学版),2018,(01):046.
　LIU Wei.Body，Intentionality and Emotion a priori：Mikel Dufrenne’sReconstruction of Kantian Aesthetics in the Way of Merleau-Ponty[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University (Social Science Edition),2018,(02):046.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
江海全，哲学博士，南通大学马克思主义学院教授（南通226019）。本文系江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目（2022SJZD074）与江苏省“双创博士”人才工程资助项目（JSSCBS20211088）的阶段性成果。
更新日期/Last Update: 2024-04-25