[1]缪因知.董事“监督”公司外部股东时的义务[J].南京师大学报(社会科学版),2022,(02):095-105.
MIAO Yinzhi.The Obligations of Directors in Monitoring Outside Shareholders[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University (Social Science Edition),2022,(02):095-105.
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董事“监督”公司外部股东时的义务
《南京师大学报》(社会科学版)[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]
- 卷:
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- 期数:
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2022年02期
- 页码:
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095-105
- 栏目:
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- 出版日期:
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2022-04-01
文章信息/Info
- Title:
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The Obligations of Directors in Monitoring Outside Shareholders
- 作者:
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缪因知
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- Author(s):
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MIAO Yinzhi
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- 关键词:
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董事会; 独立董事; 公司治理; 反收购
- Keywords:
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board of directors; independent director; corporate governance; anti-takeover
- 摘要:
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董事会或董事实施监督、制约外部股东的行为,是公司治理中的新问题,表现形式包括直接批评外部股东、提议或实施反收购措施等。董事会不可放弃的基本功能是监督、制约公司控制者(控股股东或管理层),独立董事的设置亦是为了增强董事会的这一功能。董事会对监督外部股东等其他主体行为的监督不可背离监督公司控制者的基本使命,必须满足三项条件:符合公司利益; 保持中立、防止偏袒控制者; 避免自身的利益冲突。董事包括独立董事个人亦需遵守这三项条件。董事不应以董事的个人身份对非控制者行使监督,而必须通过董事会的合议程序。董事会合议时,针对外部股东的事项越重大,越可能违反中立性、利益冲突性要求时,越应该采取更慎重、严格的审查标准。
- Abstract:
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It is a new phenomenon that a director or the board of directors take actions to monitor and check an outside shareholder. The actions include the direct criticism of an outside shareholder, adopting or proposing anti-takeover measures. The basic function the board of directors should perform is to monitor and check the corporate controller(the controlling shareholder or the management), and the independent directors are expected to enhance such a monitoring function. The board of directors may monitor any persons including outside shareholders, but such monitoring should not deviate from its major function of monitoring the controller and should conform to following three conditions: being beneficial for corporate interest; being neutral and not biased for the controller; avoidance of self-interest of the board. An individual director should also conform to these conditions and join the board discussion to engage in the monitoring, instead of acting by himself. When the board is discussing how to monitor an outside shareholder, they should employ more prudential and stricter standard as the issue raised is more significant, involves severer neutrality or conflict of interest problems.
备注/Memo
- 备注/Memo:
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缪因知,法学博士,中央财经大学法学院教授(北京100081)。
更新日期/Last Update:
1900-01-01